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Abstract
This article, written for the retirement symposium for the James I. McCord Professor J.
Wentzel van Huyssteen at Princeton Theological Seminary (‘‘Evolutionary Science and
Theological Identity,’’ November 18–19, 2014), analyzes the changing contexts and
developments of van Huyssteen’s interdisciplinary journeys in the philosophy of science,
epistemology, and science and religion. The topics discussed are biblical hermeneutics,
his relation to Wolfhart Pannenberg, critical realism, postfoundationalism, evolutionary
epistemology, paleoanthropology, and theological anthropology. The particular aim of
the article is to clarify how earlier research themes are transformed and calibrated in
van Huyssteen’s shift of emphasis from a more hermeneutical to a more pragmatist
orientation in interdisciplinary theology.
Keywords
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, critical realism, postfoundationalism, pragmatism, evolution-
ary epistemology, paleoanthropology
The aim of this article is to trace central lineages in J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s
academic and spiritual journey in interdisciplinary theology. I’m not the ﬁrst to do
so. Van Huyssteen’s oeuvre has already been discussed in a number of special
journal issues, and even in a doctoral dissertation.1 In the Festschrift in honor of
his 65th birthday, Kenneth A. Reynhout oﬀers a comprehensive presentation of
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1. Including Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 32(4) (1997) and 43(2) (2008); American Journal of
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van Huyssteen’s work, probably the best to date. Reynhout distinguishes between a
ﬁrst phase, ‘‘critical realism as rationality model for theology’’ (1970–1989), a
second phase on ‘‘the interdisciplinary shaping of rationality in a postmodern
context’’ (1990–1999), and a third phase on ‘‘the evolutionary origins of rationality
and human uniqueness’’ (2000–present).2
In what follows, my focus will be less on van Huyssteen’s chronological devel-
opment and more on the diﬀerent locations and intellectual venues for his inter-
disciplinary theology. Van Huyssteen has undertaken a remarkable journey in his
life and career. His homeland was and remains South Africa. As is evident from his
‘‘Introduction’’ to Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (the ﬁrst book he pub-
lished after he moved to Princeton), he is acutely aware of the role of geography
and place, not least with respect to the half-globe distance between Port Elizabeth
and Princeton.3 There is a diﬀerence between lecturing, say, at the Highlands
Institute for American Religious and Philosophical Thought (since 2012,
Institute for American Religious and Philosophical Thought) and at Princeton
Theological Seminary. And again it is diﬀerent to lecture in Canada and Korea,
on the European Continent and in the UK. Nonetheless, Wentzel van Huyssteen’s
style of reasoning is remarkably consistent from beginning to end, focused on
elaborating an interdisciplinary view of human rationality and theology, in par-
ticular for the ﬁeld of science and religion.
The home venue: South Africa
Let me begin with van Huysteen’s own beginnings in his South African context.
There is here much of which I only know by hearsay, such as his time as minister in
the Dutch Reformed Church (1971–1972), followed by his appointment as
Professor and Head of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of
Port Elizabeth (1972–1991). Let me remind of his early engagement with body
phenomenology in his M.A. on ‘‘Truth and Relativism in the Thought of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’’ (1966). This indicates an inﬂuence from an interactionist
phenomenology in his early education, which in fact resurfaces in later work, for
example in his 2006 article ‘‘When Our Bodies Do the Thinking, Theology and
Science Converge,’’ where the ‘‘patterns of our daily experience’’ are seen as the
2. Kenneth A. Reynhout, ‘‘The Evolution of van Huyssteen’s Model of Rationality,’’ in The Evolution
of Rationality. Interdisciplinary Essays in Honor of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ed. F. Leron Shults
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 1–18. In the same volume, I offered my account of the develop-
ment of van Huyssteen’s work, especially within the first and second phase: ‘‘What Theology Might
Learn (and Not Learn) from Evolutionary Psychology: A Postfoundationalist Theologian in
Conversation with Pascal Boyer,’’ 306–26, esp. 307–11. Some observations from this article are
expanded upon below.
3. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 1–8 (1).
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inevitable entry point for interdisciplinary thinking.4 No wonder, therefore, that
Merleau-Ponty’s work comes up again in the Giﬀord Lectures, and in van
Huyssteen’s later interaction with Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s phenomenology of
body movement.5
In his intellectual baggage from South Africa the role of hermeneutics is per-
spicuous, as evidenced in the Powell Lectures that he delivered at the University of
South Africa in 1987. There he argues that biblical authority should not be
appealed to as a discussion stopper, but rather be seen a primary resource for
how Christians come to terms with reality. The focus is on what he calls ‘‘the
quality of the biblical text,’’ including its continuous ‘‘referential power’’ for
Christians using the biblical text as a ‘‘way to God.’’6 The Bible is read from a
hermeneutical reader-response perspective, informed by the work of James Barr
and Paul Ricoeur. As a systematic theologian van Huyssteen is thus interested in
the reader’s actions involved in responding to the biblical text. This text (1) evokes
religious experience, (2) implies ontological commitment, and (3) provides, through
the metaphorical nature of the central concepts of biblical language, a striking con-
tinuity of reference in the history of Christian thought.7
By ascribing to a reader-response perspective (as early as 1987), van Huyssteen
argues against a biblical literalism while also guarding himself against the opposite
danger that the Bible is read at the mercy of a pure relativism: ‘‘The role of the
reader can, however, never be pressed in such a way as to imply an inﬁnite rela-
tivism on the part of the text or its authority.’’8 The text has a reality of its own,
one may say, which is then used to illuminate the world in front of us.9
4. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘When Our Bodies Do the Thinking, Theology and Science Converge,’’
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 27(2–3) (2006): 127–53 (153). See also below with
reference to the Gifford Lectures.
5. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Should Theology Take Evolutionary Ethics Seriously? A Conversation
with Hannah Arendt and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone,’’ NGTT 54(3–4) (2013), 275–85.
6. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘The Realism of the Text: A Perspective on Biblical Authority,’’ in
Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 124–61 (158–60), italics in
original. Later, in his Gifford Lectures, he speaks of the biblical texts as having a ‘‘gravitational
force,’’ or ‘‘pull,’’ a power of attraction mediated by the reception history; see Alone in the World?
Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology. The Gifford Lectures. The University of Edinburgh.
Spring 2004 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 115: ‘‘a canon, as a complex but identifiable core
identity, and as embodying a rich galaxy of meanings, thus has gravitational force, or a gravita-
tional pull that is the result of the way its own internal structure relates to and is construed in the
always plural history of its interpretative relations.’’
7. Van Huyssteen, ‘‘The Realism of the Text,’’ 151.
8. Ibid., 148.
9. As phrased by Paul Ricoeur: ‘‘To interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world unfolded in
front of the text’’; see Ricoeur, ‘‘The Hermeneutical Function of Distantiation,’’ in Hermeneutics
and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, ed. John B. Thompson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), 131–44 (141).
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In his early lectures on biblical hermeneutics, van Huyssteen is already referring
to science–religion discussions. The natural sciences should not necessarily ‘‘be
regarded as the paradigm for what constitutes reliable knowledge.’’10 The future
program of postfoundationalism was here in the making, though still couched
mainly in the framework of critical realism. But also later, when the postfounda-
tionalist view was in place, as in the John Albert Hall Lectures given at the
University of Victoria, Canada, published as Duet or Duel? Theology and Science
in the Postmodern World in 1998, van Huyssteen emphasized the ‘‘semantic sur-
plus’’ of theology in relation to science, thus arguing that
the theological redescription of the world, therefore, can never be merely a mirroring
of the world of science. It is always, rather, a complementary view in which the very
special epistemological focus, distinct experiential dimension and heuristic apparatus
of theological reﬂection creatively illuminate not only the world of science, but also
the wider world around it.11
From one perspective, our scientiﬁc understanding of the world is capable of both
constraining and expanding views of reality oﬀered by theology, but on the other
hand, theology has many other epistemic resources by addressing aspects of reality
in which the natural sciences have no particular interest. Accordingly, theology is
not to be described as a causal explanation in conﬂict with scientiﬁc explanations,
but rather as a complementary interaction with reality. One thing is causal explan-
ation; another thing is semantic explanation, that is, hermeneutical explication.
There remains a hermeneutical basis for all theological reasoning, though the ques-
tions of ontological truth claims cannot be replaced by the reading of classic texts
of tradition: ‘‘[A]ll systematic theology may be said to be basically interpretative or
hermeneutical, but then hermeneutical in a sense that concerns not only meaning
but also the question of truth.’’12 Certainly, van Huyssteen does not want to suc-
cumb to the ‘‘pan-linguistic folly’’ of some current strands of hermeneutical phil-
osophy and deconstructive postmodernism.13
Between Amsterdam and Munich: the interaction with
Wolfhart Pannenberg
The doctoral dissertation on ‘‘Rationality and Faith in the Thought of Wolfhart
Pannenberg’’ (in Dutch, 1970) was based on studies at the Free University of
10. Van Huyssteen, ‘‘The Realism of the Text,’’ 127; italics in original.
11. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in the Postmodern World (London:
SCM Press, 1998), 161; cf. 126.
12. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith: Constructing Theories in
Systematic Theology, trans. H.F. Snijders (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989; Dutch, 1986), 171.
13. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Response to Critics,’’ American Journal of Theology & Philosophy
28(3) (2007): 409–32 (431–32).
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Amsterdam 1966–1970, and a longer stay at Ludwig Maximilian University of
Munich during 1969. Observe that the topic was here not on the rationality of
theology per se, but the relation between rationality and faith. Whenever van
Huyssteen speaks about epistemology, there is always an undercurrent of ﬁrst-
order religious commitments involved. One would not do justice to van
Huyssteen’s program in saying that we have faith commitments as a ﬁrst-order
phenomenon, then systematic theology as a second-order reﬂection of religious
experience, and then epistemology as a third-level reﬂection, staying aloof, as it
were, from ﬁrst-order commitments. Rather, from beginning to end, van
Huyssteen’s program for a postfoundationalist epistemology emphasizes ‘‘the
high degree of personal commitment in religious and theological theorizing.’’14
While not shying away from taking an intellectual stance to faith commitments
as part of a philosophical self-reﬂection, van Huyssteen underlines that we are
never decontextualized human beings. Human beings are human persons, and
human persons are both embodied and socially embedded. Therefore, it is ﬁnally
not propositions that are rational or irrational, but human persons are rational,
insofar as they give reasons for their stance in communication with others.
This personal orientation comes fully to the fore in van Huyssteen’s critical
questions to Wolfhart Pannenberg. In many ways, van Huyssteen’s later
Theology and the Justiﬁcation of Faith from 1989 is an updated work in line with
Pannenberg’s Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie from 1973. Here van Huyssteen
won his ‘‘street cred’’ in science and religion by working through distinctive devel-
opments of the contemporary philosophy of science—from the Vienna School
through Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos to Thomas Kuhn and Larry Laudan. In
contrast to Pannenberg, however, van Huyssteen also focused on the question of
the role of metaphors in theological language when presenting his version of a
critical realism within theology.
Accordingly, there are some particular signatures to van Huyssteen’s critical
interaction with Pannenberg. First, whereas Pannenberg speaks about theology
as a hypothesis of God capable of covering all relevant data, van Huyssteen trans-
lates Pannenberg as implying that a theology has proved itself ‘‘if it has succeeded
in maximally solving and meaningfully integrating problematic data and mankind’s
experiences of reality.’’15 This emphasis on problem-solving and experiential mean-
ing can, with hindsight, be seen as a more pragmatic orientation of van Huyssteen’s
work. A few years later, van Huyssteen is translating Pannenberg’s emphasis on
theological propositions and ‘‘statements’’ into ‘‘convictions.’’16 Accordingly he
asks Pannenberg the following question: ‘‘At this stage we may begin to pose a
central critical question to Pannenberg: How does he justify his view of the role of
the theologian’s personal religious commitment in the process of theorizing in
14. Van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 6.
15. Van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith, 95.
16. Van Huyssteen, ‘‘Truth and Commitment in Theology and Science: A Critical Appraisal of
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Perspective’’ (1989), Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 53–72 (59).
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theology, and his deﬁnition of truth and objectivity in theology and science?’’17 This
question, if I understand it correctly, is not merely an amendment to Pannenberg’s
program of theology, but a question about its foundations. Whereas for
Pannenberg the idea of God—as a statement about something—is kept ‘‘distinct
from the person who makes that statement,’’ van Huyssteen’s order goes the other
way around, from personal convictions to theological statements.18 This is not an
innocent reversal of order, since van Huyssteen eventually questions the distinction
between ‘‘the context of discovery’’ and ‘‘the context of justiﬁcation’’ so central to
Karl Popper’s (and Imre Lakatos’s) philosophy of science. Accordingly, he asks
‘‘whether personal faith—which operates in ‘the context of discovery’—can really
be separated from the theoretical context of justiﬁcation. Why not consciously
allow for the accounting of this subjective element from the outset in one’s
method?’’19 In other words, the level of the explanans and the level of the explan-
andum cannot be cleanly separated. Religious interpretation is always self-invol-
ving, whereby the explainer him- or herself becomes part of what is to be explained.
Human beings are, to use a phrase of Charles Taylor’s, ‘‘self-interpreting
animals.’’20
Critical realism: entering the Anglo–American dialogue
of science and religion
When writing Theology and the Justiﬁcation of Faith, van Huyssteen hardly had at
hand a fully satisfying model for dealing with the role of the personal commitments
and social embedment in theology. What he had at his disposal was a ‘‘critical-
realist perspective,’’ by which he situated himself in the Anglo–American discussion
on science and religion.21 Against the trend of postliberal theology, for example in
George Lindbeck, van Huyssteen insists that religious experience is and remains an
indispensable background for theology, not replaceable by a Wittgensteinian
emphasis on the cultural-linguistic performances within the church. As a matter
of fact, ‘‘people grapple with religious experience also outside established denom-
inations, and therefore the theologian is functioning contextually also by deﬁning
and attempting to solve valid problems outside existing churches.’’22 First, the
reality depiction of second-order theological statements presupposes the claims
of ﬁrst-order religious commitments: ‘‘At the basis of the reasons for using this
term [of critical realism] is the conviction that what we are provisionally
17. Ibid., 58, italics in original.
18. Van Huyssteen, ‘‘Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Science: The Need for Methodological
and Theoretical Clarity in Theology’’ (1981), Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 105–23 (119).
19. Ibid., 122.
20. Charles Taylor, ‘‘Self-interpreting Animals,’’ in Philosophical Papers Vol 1: Human Agency and
Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 45–76.
21. Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 125–77.
22. Ibid., 166.
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conceptualizing in theology really exists.’’23 Second, van Huyssteen makes clear
that theological statements rest on a ﬂuid network of religious metaphors and
models, which are not fully translatable into theoretical statements but rather
have an explorative nature:
we are not simply describing realities that are equally accessible by other means.
Language does not merely represent or reﬂect reality; it also constitutes reality. In
this sense metaphoric language opens up to us, both creatively and exploratively, the
reality of which we speak, since what we see as reality is to a large extent creatively and
exploratively determined by the metaphoric potential of the language in which reality
is depicted.24
Third, van Huyssteen is keenly aware that the feature of a ‘‘convergent realism’’ in
some of the mature sciences (for example, geology reaching still better approxima-
tions to the movements of tectonic plates) is ‘‘virtually impossible’’ in theology;
with Ernan McMullin he is worried of a too direct move from scientiﬁc realism to a
critical realism in theology: ‘‘I think that anyone considering the possibilities of
scientiﬁc realism for theology should be extremely wary of an uncritical, superﬁcial
transferring of the realism of science to the domain of religious belief, and to
theology as the reﬂection on the claims of this belief.’’25
Here again, the hermeneutical character of van Huyssteen’s argument comes to
the fore. Theology only refers to divine reality in the context of linguistic networks
that open up possibilities of human engagement with divinity. Accordingly, theo-
logical models and metaphors are redescribing the world(s) of nature as already
(partly) described and (partly) explained by the sciences.26 This hermeneutical
23. Van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith, 155 (emphasis mine). Van Huyssteen’s
early position is presented in condensed form in ‘‘Experience and Explanation: The Justification of
Cognitive Claims in Theology’’ (1988), Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 162–79; the author
points out that he is only willing to argue ‘‘for a qualified and weak form of critical realism’’ (167),
insofar as the referential claims are derived from ‘‘basic assumption and good reasons,’’ without
the reasons being conclusive, and without the claim of a progressively convergent realism. See also
my article, ‘‘Critical Realism and Other Realisms,’’ in Fifty Years in Science and Theology: Ian G.
Barbour and His Legacy, ed. Robert J. Russell (Aldershot: Ashgate 2004), 77–96.
24. Van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith, 137–38.
25. Ibid., 150, 155. See also Fabio Gironi, ‘‘The Theological Hijacking of Realism: Critical Realism in
‘Science and Religion’,’’ Journal of Critical Realism 11(1) (2012): 40–75. Gironi wrongly presup-
poses that when theologians such as van Huyssteen refer to the reality of God, they slip in ‘‘a
Reality at the top (or at the base) of the order of being, well beyond both the human and the
natural ontological stratum’’ (48–49). If God is the infinite or encompassing Reality, there is no
such natural–supernatural dichotomy.
26. The concept of ‘‘redescription’’ only comes up occasionally in Theology and the Justification of
Faith (e.g. p. 157), but attains a central role in J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel?, 125–28,
160–64. Van Huyssteen kindly refers to my insistence that the role of offering causal explanations
and the task of giving semantic explanation should not be conflated. The term ‘‘redescription,’’ by
the way, has its provenance in Donald Davidson’s concept of ‘‘radical interpretation,’’ where no
formal translation schemes exist.
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orientation may also explain why van Huyssteen never followed otherwise popular
attempts to apply Imre Lakotos’s model of rationality to the justiﬁcation of reli-
gious truth claims.27 The realism, in other words, is not between words and things
(as if they were two quite diﬀerent areas), but applies to structures—in theology to
the relations between God and humanity or world, as apprehended by religious
interpreters. Here there is a similarity to the basic realist claim that also ‘‘the
scientist is in a creative way discovering the structures of the world.’’28
This critical realism was seriously transformed in the wake of van Huyssteen’s
later pragmatist orientation. Seen from the postfoundational perspective, realism
‘‘does not represent a discovered fact or a justiﬁed position, but rather the meth-
odological presupposition of our praxis of inquiry.’’29 The realism is thus a pre-
supposition undergirding the multiple interactions of the believer with worldly
realities, when speaking of the encompassing reality of God. Since there is no
strict dichotomy between the ‘natural’ and the ‘supernatural,’ no reductionist
choice should be made between scientiﬁc and theological descriptions of reality.30
Princeton: a new habitat for interdisciplinary theology
Princeton became and remains the second home for Wentzel and Hester van
Huyssteen. Preceded by a fellowship at the Center of Theological Inquiry in
1990, van Huyssteen came to Princeton Theological Seminary January 1, 1992 as
the inaugural holder of the James I. McCord professorship in theology and science.
At PTS he found a fertile collegial work space which allowed him to teach science
and religion courses continuously, to put the books he wanted to work with on the
curricula, and to discuss them intensely with the excellent students at the seminary.
‘‘Always work with the best and newest literature in the ﬁeld’’ became his working
motto, as also revealed in his many interactions with contemporary scientists and
philosophers. Any reader is therefore well educated through van Huyssteen’s
essays, resulting from the sometimes hectic lecture program of the new
Princetonian. In fact, Princeton Theological Seminary not only served as a home
base, but also as an open door to the outside world—not only to AAR and the
27. See van Huyssteen’s criticism of Nancey Murphy’s bold work in her Theology in an Age of
Scientific Reasoning (Ithaca: Cornell, 1990), in ‘‘Is the Postmodernist Always a
Postfoundationalist? Nancey Murphy’s Lakatosian Model for Theology,’’ Theology Today 50(3)
(1993): 373–86, reprinted in Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 73–90.
28. Theology and the Justification of Faith, 151 (with reference to Ernan McMullin).
29. See his ‘‘Postfoundationalism in Theology and Science,’’ in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six
Models for the Current Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 13–50 (39). Or as put in Nicholas Rescher’s terms, ‘‘realism
is a position to which we are constrained not by the push of evidence, but by the pull of purpose’’ (50,
italics in original).
30. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Pluralism and Interdisciplinarity: In Search of Theology’s Public
Voice,’’ American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 22(1) (2001): 65–87 (78).
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Highlands Institute, but also to the creative triangle between Princeton, Scotland,
and Seoul, and to many Canadian and European audiences.
Already the inaugural lecture for the James I. McCord chair, ‘‘Theology and
Science: The Quest for a New Apologetics,’’ revealed many of the topics to be
developed in the coming years. ‘‘The question how theology and science should
relate to one another is, of course, neither a theological nor a scientiﬁc issue. It
is, rather, an epistemological issue, that is, an issue about how two very diﬀerent
claims to knowledge are to be related.’’31 With Philip Clayton, van Huyssteen
pointed to the ‘‘contextualist shift’’ in the contemporary philosophy of the nat-
ural sciences, where the search for explanation and intelligibility is ‘‘relativized
and become an element within the broader hermeneutical task of science.’’32
Also the distinction between personal, communal, and transcommunal explan-
ations comes up in the inaugural lecture, the latter oﬀering news ways of articu-
lating the theological tradition of apologetics and natural theology in a
contemporary context.33 Even the term ‘‘the shaping of rationality’’ is
announced, later to become the title of his main work in epistemology, The
Shaping of Rationality from 1999.
The program of a postfoundationalist theology earlier announced was reﬁned
and presented in a fuller scale in The Shaping of Rationality: Toward
Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science. As rightly observed by Josh Reeves,
van Huyssteen here uses both a negative and a positive strategy in deﬁning the
space for postfoundationalism.34 The negative strategy is to show that both foun-
dationalism and nonfoundationalism fail—the ﬁrst by discouraging conversation
by reference to the safe haven of scientiﬁc evidence, the latter by referring to the
safe heaven of establishing holistic webs of beliefs, such as in narrative theology.
The positive strategy is to show that postfoundationalism steers a middle course by
oﬀering the best from the worlds of modernity and postmodernity. For example:
accept science for what it is, the best bets we have for understanding the structure
of the universe and evolution of life and humanity. But also: acknowledge that
rationality remains person- and situation-relative, always undergirded by a ﬂexible
use of common-sense deliberations, reaping from many resources of human
experience.
In The Shaping of Rationality from 1999, van Huyssteen re-emphasized the
earlier hermeneutical orientation, while giving hermeneutical interpretation a prag-
matist twist. The hermeneutical orientation was retained insofar as he continues to
underline the pre-theoretical character of rationality while pointing to the
31. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Theology and Science: The Quest for a New Apologetics’’ (1993),
Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 215–37 (221).
32. Ibid., 232.
33. Ibid. 232, 234.
34. Josh Reeves, ‘‘Problems for Postfoundationalists: Evaluating J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s
Interdisciplinary Theory of Rationality,’’ The Journal of Religion 93(2) (2013): 131–50.
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formative role of traditions as ‘‘boundaries of our habitations.’’35 Traditions are
inescapable as our epistemic starting points—they are the boundaries from which
we address the world. But traditions are not inevitably our ﬁnal destination—we
can both extend our traditions by entering into trans-communal dialogues and also
take leave of traditions, even if we continue to be marked by them.36
The new pragmatist orientation implies that rationality no longer resides ﬁrst
and foremost in the capacity to open up interpretative horizons, but in the capacity
of rational agents to form responsible judgments and seek optimal understandings,
given the speciﬁc context and the speciﬁc problems to be solved. Human rationality
is indeed humane.
There are several philosophical inspirations behind this shift of orientation in
van Huyssteen’s work.37 The ﬁrst name to be mentioned is probably Nicholas
Rescher, from whom van Huyssteen learned to speak of the dimensions of ration-
ality. Alongside the cognitive dimension we have the evaluative and the pragmatic
dimensions which correspond to the human pursuit of values and appropriate
action. With Rescher, van Huyssteen regards science as the prime case for the
cognitive pursuit of truth, while insisting that scientiﬁc rationality is just one
subset of rationality at work.38 Accordingly, philosophers and theologians must
learn to acquire what Rescher calls a ‘‘dissensus tolerance’’ between the diﬀerent
forms of reasoning, each proper for diﬀerent and distinctive purposes.39 Finally
from Rescher comes the view that any ‘‘theoretical cycle’’ of argumentation is to
be accompanied by an ‘‘applicative cycle’’ of real-life implementation, which
ﬁnally determines the fertility of our leading ideas, hence deciding about their
feasibility.40
Another source of inspiration is Harold Brown’s theory of rationality that led
van Huyssteen to see the concept of rational beliefs to be derivative to the reason-
ing of agents, who are making the rational estimates about truth, values, and
35. See J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology
and Science (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999), 252–59, where he (following Delwin Brown,
Boundaries of Our Habitations: Tradition and Theological Construction [New York: SUNY
Press, 1994]) discusses how rational self-reflection is shaped by traditions without being tied up
with unnegotiable truth claims.
36. See further ‘‘When Our Bodies Do the Thinking,’’ 141–46, esp. 143.
37. Again, this pragmatic orientation is anticipated in van Huyssteen’s early reception of Larry
Laudan’s work in Theology and the Justification of Faith, 172–90.
38. Van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 246–47; The Shaping of Rationality, 128–
29, 162: ‘‘I think, the selection of science as our clearest example of the cognitive/theoretical
dimension of rationality at work is indeed justified. What is not justified, however, is any claim
for the superiority of scientific rationality, and any attempt to extend uncritically the nature of a
strictly scientific rationality to the rationality of religious or any other reflection.’’ Cf. Nicholas
Rescher, Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
39. ‘‘When Our Bodies Do the Thinking,’’ 150.
40. Nicholas Rescher, A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Volume 1: Human Knowledge in Idealistic
Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University, 1992), 175.
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adequate behavior.41 Rationality is not only a general capacity, but an ‘‘epistemic
skill’’ to be learned, in analogy to physical skills.
Finally, Calvin Schrag had used the term ‘‘transversal rationality’’ to describe
the fact that rationality is not domain-speciﬁc but emerges in the intersection, cross-
ing-over, or interweaving of forms of rational discernment in diﬀerent areas of
life—from the sciences to religion and everyday practices.42 In a sense, this open-
ended transversality replaces the modernist concept of unrestricted universality.43
Interestingly, the concept of transversality itself goes back to Jean-Paul Sartre’s
concept of the intersection of intentionalities, by which past experiences are retained
in ever new intentional acts of the I. Sometimes I have been wondering, What would
have happened if van Huyssteen had written out the phenomenological insights
undergirding his epistemological reﬂections? Anyway, the comprehensive view of
rationality that van Huyssteen develops from beginning to end accentuates that
rational agents are always embedded in communicative contexts, in which agents
have to account for their views while taking issues with the best candidates on the
market of rational ideas, and having to apply these ideas in real life contexts. On the
one hand, there exists no solitary epistemological subject a` la Kant (but only con-
textually situated individuals). On the other hand, rational procedures guide our
behavior, even where we have no foundational starting points available. Our steps
forward cannot be controlled by following rules set up prior to our walking.
In consequence, the dialogue between science and religion shows diﬀerent
aspects of contact. There are shared resources of rationality between theology
and the sciences (for example, logic and the search for order and intelligibility).
There are overlapping elements of rationality (such as the role of models and
metaphors in theorizing, and our realist instincts guiding our search for truth).
Finally, we have very distinctive forms of rationality that cannot easily be trans-
ferred from one discipline to another. Mathematical equations in science, for
example, have no counterpart in theological rationality, whereas the search for
meaning, value, and existential relevance in theology has no immediate analogue
in the proper sciences (though, perhaps, in popular science).44
Was van Huyssteen ever a postmodernist?
While distancing himself from the relativistic versions of postmodernism, there
should be no doubt that during the 1990s van Huyssteen felt postmodernism as
41. Van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 247–54; The Shaping of Rationality, 142–
50. Cf. Harold Brown, Rationality (London: Routledge 1990).
42. Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, 132–39. Cf. Calvin O. Schrag, The Resources of
Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge (Bloomington: Indiana University 1992),
and especially, ‘‘Transversal Rationality,’’ in The Question of Hermeneutics, ed. T.J. Stapleton
(Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1994).
43. ‘‘When Our Bodies Do the Thinking,’’ 137; cf. 140: ‘‘transversality ultimately replaces
universality.’’
44. Van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel?, 160–66.
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a liberation from the imprisonment under too abstract notions of rationality. ‘‘In a
postfoundationalist epistemology the modernist distinction between ‘objective’
empirical (read: scientiﬁc) reasons and more ‘subjective’ ethical, religious, or aes-
thetic reasons is revealed as nonsensical.’’45 Accordingly, he was seen by many
(perhaps even by himself at that time?) as a postmodernist thinker. I must admit
that I sometimes asked myself at that time, Are the cognitive contents of theology
and the empirical elements of scientiﬁc reasoning taken suﬃciently seriously in the
wake of Wentzel’s pragmatist turn and postmodern leanings? In the fall of 1996
when we together wrote the introduction to our co-edited book, Rethinking
Theology and Science, we agreed upon using the term ‘‘cognitive pluralism’’ as a
description of the postmodern situation rather than seeing postmodernism as a
normative concept in contrast to modernism.
Those fearing in those days that van Huyssteen was about to go down the slope
of postmodernism should be aware that for him the discourse of postmodernity
remains in contact with modernity, just as the discourses of modernity remain
within the web of postmodern discourse.46 Uncompromisingly stated, ‘‘postmod-
ern thought is undoubtedly part of the modern and not modern thought coming
to an end.’’47 In van Huyssteen there is a ‘‘to-and-fro movement’’ between mod-
ernity and postmodernity, not a unilateral road leading from modernity to post-
modernity. As we shall now see, there is even a strong sense of a premodernity
living in us and being with us in the form of phylogenetically acquired forms of
cognition.
The venue of evolutionary epistemology
In Duet or Duel? from 1998, the issue of epistemology was also approached from an
evolutionary perspective. With evolutionary epistemology, van Huyssteen pointed
to the common biological roots of human rationality. These roots may explain, at
least in part, the ‘‘universal traits’’ of human reasoning:
Evolutionary epistemology thus reveals the process of evolution as a belief-gaining
process, a process that in humans, too, is shaped pre-consciously. All our beliefs, and I
would argue, also our religious beliefs, thus have evolutionary origins and were estab-
lished by mechanisms working reliably in the world of our ancestors. This still does
not mean, however, that the theory of evolution by natural selection can oﬀer an
adequate explanation for beliefs that far transcend their biological origins. But this
again underlines the fact that cognition is a general characteristic of all living beings,
45. Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, 150.
46. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Is There a Postmodern Challenge in Theology and Science?’’ (1997),
Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 266–79 (279). See also Duet or Duel?, 25–26.
47. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘Should We Be Trying So Hard to Be Postmodern? A Response to
Drees, Haught, and Yeager,’’ Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 32(1) (1997): 567–84 (582).
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and that human rationality, therefore, can only be fully understood if its biological
roots are understood.48
So, while evolutionary epistemology certainly can explain the general trajectories of
human reasoning, it cannot explain the particular routes of philosophical and
religious traditions, and the particular ways of knowing and arguing within these
traditions. For the same reason, particular forms of belief, such as christology and
trinitarian belief, or Zen Buddhism, cannot be said to be validated by evolution,
even though some of their basic assumptions follow general trajectories honed by
evolution.
Van Huyssteen takes a very similar position to the idea of evolutionary ethics.
The fact that morality is rooted in our biological make-up as social embodied
primates does not mean that particular moral codes can be derived from evolution:
‘‘[F]rom the evolutionary genesis of our moral awareness we cannot derive moral
codes for right or wrong. Accepting that our moral awareness has evolved also
means accepting that our moral codes may not be ﬁxed forever as unchangeable
entities.’’49 Van Huyssteen thus follows the same kind of reasoning regarding the
evolutionary roots of religion and ethics. Just as there is no reason to distrust
empathy as a guideline for ethics, there is no a priori reason to distrust the sense
of the divine in religion, though we cannot claim that particular ethical or religious
systems are simply true by being biologically rooted. Rather, biological evolution
facilitates a cultural space for evaluating truth claims and ethical judgment.
If The Shaping of Rationality could be read as an epistemological withdrawal
from more substantial interactions between science and theology, Duet or Duel?
evidenced that this was far from the author’s intention. And soon the transversal
concept of interdisciplinary laid out in The Shaping of Rationality was to be applied
to the discussion of human origins and human nature. Put in Rescher’s terms, ‘‘the
theoretical cycle’’ of postfoundationalist epistemology was to be exercised on the
material problems in a large scale ‘‘applicative cycle’’ involving paleoanthropology
and theological anthropology.
The venue of paleoanthropology
I am here, of course, referring to van Huyssteen’s 2004 Giﬀord Lectures at
Edinburgh University given under the name Are We Alone? Science and
Theology on Human Uniqueness, later published under a slightly changed title.50
Alone in the World? discusses the species speciﬁcity of humanity in close con-
versation with leading paleoanthropologists and archaeologists, and in more crit-
ical interaction with evolutionary cognitive theories of religion. How to speak of
48. Van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel?, 151–52.
49. Van Huyssteen, ‘‘Should Theology Take Evolutionary Ethics Seriously?,’’ 282.
50. Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology. The Gifford
Lectures. The University of Edinburgh. Spring 2004.
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humans as created in the image and likeness of God in this context? I guess I am
correct in saying that van Huyssteen’s book is the only comprehensive book deal-
ing with this subject matter from a theologically informed perspective. Wentzel was
alone in creating a fertile space for an interaction between paleoanthropology and
theological anthropology.
The point of Alone in the World? is exactly to show how ‘‘[t]ransversal lines of
argument between evolutionary epistemology and paleoanthropology converge
and intersect on the fact that the very ﬁrst modern humans were distinct in the
evolution of their symbolic, cognitive ﬂuid minds.’’51 It is this ‘‘cognitive ﬂuidity’’
(a term coined by Steven Mithen) which leads to the creative symbolic behavior
witnessed in cave art and in the emergence of religious awareness.
With evolutionary epistemology, van Huyssteen understands the human species as
a particular form of an information processing system: ‘‘[N]ot only has evolution
produced cognitive phenomena, but evolution itself can be seen as a cognition process
or, more precisely, a cognition-gaining process.’’52 We are thus still carrying with us
earlier instincts (for example, fear of snakes) in a phylogenetic memory that is not in
principle diﬀerent from the snarling of kittens at dogs.53 Moreover, this phylogenetic
memory must have some adaptive value, also for early humans. Even if not totally
correct, such species-wide knowledge has proven overall to be reliable by facilitating
appropriate forms of orientation vis-a`-vis the environment. Evolutionary epistemolo-
gists such as Franz Wuketits admit that human cognition also entails a drive for
metaphysical explanation, including notions of another world and life after death.54
But curiously enough, Wuketits ﬁnds this religious awareness to be fully unreliable,
and without any importance for the future development of the human race. Here van
Huyssteen raises two questions to Wuketits:
Why should we, so suddenly and only on this point, distrust the phylogenetic mem-
ories of our direct ancestors, and why should the emergence of religious consciousness
be explained only in terms of speciﬁc life-conditions in prehistoric times? Might there
not be something about being human, something about the human condition itself,
that could oﬀer us a slightly diﬀerent perspective on the enduring need for religious
faith?55
Van Huyssteen is fully aware that evolutionary epistemology cannot be used to
bolster the correctness of particular religious views, just as it cannot serve as a
proof for the reality of God.56 He insists that the space opened by religious aware-
ness, for reasons of consistency, should be treated fully on a par with other
51. Ibid., 212.
52. Ibid., 87.
53. Ibid., 84.
54. Ibid., 94.
55. Ibid., 218.
56. Ibid., 102–109.
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outcomes of evolutionarily evolved cognition, and also by evolutionary epistem-
ologists. As a matter of fact, the questioning of the material limitations of human
existence seems to be species-speciﬁc to humanity.
Moreover, central to evolutionary epistemology is its interactionist orienta-
tion.57 The adaptations of early humans to their environments gave rise to an
intra-organismic development, not least evidenced in the development of the pre-
frontal cortex, and in the particular array of human uses of our ﬂexible brains. But
the process also goes the other way around: the shaping of rationality through
adaptive evolution is accompanied by the constructive shaping of the environment
by human communities, building up external niches for human communities in a
gradual move from natural habitats to sociocultural homes, including also religious
traditions.
I cannot but note that van Huyssteen’s program here seems closely akin to later
work done at Harvard University on the idea of deep history, in which also the
traditional divide between historical time and prehistory evaporates.58 Both Daniel
Lord Smail and Wentzel van Huyssteen understand human personhood and com-
munity formation from an interactionist perspective that focuses on human agency
as embodied in its relationships to ecological environments, constantly remolded
by human intervention, and guided by the use of symbolic thought unique to
the human species. As a result, we may not be so vastly diﬀerent from our fore-
bears. As van Huyssteen notes, the Cro-Magnons of the Upper Paleolithic were, in
a sense, ‘‘us.’’59
From a methodological perspective, this interactionist view of biological and
cultural evolution diﬀers from the ﬁxed view understanding of the human mind
that one ﬁnds in some proponents of evolutionary cognitive theory of religion.
Pascal Boyer, for example, presupposes that the human mind works as a semi-
automatic machine, restlessly generating foreseeable outputs in reaction to minimal
inputs. Concepts of God, for example, are generated by a ‘‘Hyperactive Agency
Detection Device’’ (HAAD), which comes up spontaneously when humans are
confronted with fear. According to Steven Mithen, by contrast, our minds are
evolved through a general intelligence which was later specialized, until it reached
the level of cognitive ﬂuidity: the symbolic threshold. In this view we are embodied
beings with ﬂexible minds, capable of exercising a broad array of self-reﬂective
capacities. Art, morality, and religion are thus to be seen as typical expressions
of the human mind. Accordingly, human symbolic behavior cannot be divided into
57. Towards the end of Alone in the World? (p. 276), Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ‘‘phenomenology of
the flesh’’ is quoted: ‘‘I cannot understand the function of the living body except by enacting it
myself, and except in so far as I am a body which rises towards the world’’ (Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes [London: Routledge and K. Paul,
1962; French original, 1945]), 75.
58. Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: California University Press, 2006);
Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present, ed. Andrew Shyrock and Daniel Lord Smail
(Berkeley: University of California, 2011).
59. Alone in the World?, 218.
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constructs of a natural ‘‘agency detection device’’ versus a ‘‘hyperactive’’ one.
Similarly, ritual behaviors cannot be categorized into too clear-cut distinctions
between what is useful, or adaptive, in a mundane sense, and what is more than
useful, such as play and religious imagination. While van Huyssteen agrees with
evolutionary psychology that there is a ‘‘naturalness’’ to religious imagination, he
insists that naturalness is not the same as pre-reﬂective automaticity. There is no
reason to believe that the religious mentality of early humans was devoid of self-
reﬂection.60 Religious imagination is thus a ‘‘natural’’ propensity, using the same
neuronal structures and the same cognitive ﬂuidity as in tool construction, in the
planning of a hunt, in the moral ordering of social systems, or in the production of
art and deliberate burial sites, showing the vital importance of religious imagin-
ation for Neolithic communities.61
Of special interest to van Huyssteen’s project is what Ian Tattersal has called
the ‘‘cultural exploration’’ from 60,000 to 30,000 years ago. Here we ﬁnd new
expressions of art and other expressions of a symbolic awareness that seem to go
beyond the realm of the visible. Van Huyssteen is well aware that archeological
ﬁndings and paleoanthropological material are open for interpretation. Any
paleoanthropologist needs to muse on the meanings of the ﬁndings, and to
make inferences as to the best explanation of the available data. Could we
have ﬂutes without ritualized dancing? Could we have cave paintings without
a symbolic meaning that goes beyond mere referential meaning? Could we have
burial sites with the heads placed towards the east without having belief in
afterlife? The vote of van Huyssteen to these questions is a resounding ‘‘No.’’
Do some cave paintings indicate shamanism as an early form of religion, but
other sites not? Could we have a symbolic mind prior to the formation of the
laryngeal tract, the precondition for complex oral speech? The vote of van
Huyssteen to these questions is an emphatic ‘‘Yes.’’ From here, he goes on to
raise a larger set of new research questions: Which role might the body language
of the bipedal walk have had prior to oral language, for sexual exposure, for
example? Were our ancestors just imagining the invisible in linguistic forms?
Could not perhaps a religious meaning be carried by a deliberate ordering of
material structures, as evidenced in C¸atalho¨yu¨k, where the bodies of the
deceased were buried inside the houses, excavated after some time, dismembered,
using the skulls as pillars for new houses, while ornamenting other skulls and
body remnants? Moreover, are we a species that has discovered God as ‘‘praying
animals’’ (Robert W. Jenson), not just by being a species speaking about ‘‘the
beyond,’’ but a species experiencing being addressed by God? Similarly, what is
60. Ibid., 261–70.
61. On burial sites, see van Huysteen’s reflection on Ian Hodder’s studies on the understanding of
individual selfhood and trans-generational transcendence in the lower Neolithic society of
C¸atalho¨yu¨k (Turkey), ‘‘The Historical Self: Memory and Religion at C¸atalho¨yu¨k,’’ in Religion
at Work in a Neolithic Society. Vital Matters, ed. Ian Hodder (Cambridge: Cambridge University,
2014), 109–33 (114–21).
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the relation between early religion and the morality of living together in groups,
with rules for food-sharing, kinshipping, and burial sites?62
Questions such as these feature centrally in Alone in the World? as well as in the
subsequent discussions thereof. Wentzel van Huyssteen is the ﬁrst to admit the
unknowns.63 But it is consistent with van Huyssteen’s own program that such ques-
tions can only be dealt with in an academically responsible manner if one is willing to
participate in long-term conversations with the best experts in the ﬁeld—even though
they sometimes disagree. Some argue for a more gradualist approach, others for a
more discontinuous development. As argued by van Huyssteen, the distinction
between gradualism and discontinuity cannot be kept up rigidly.64 There is both a
continuity between humans and higher apes, and a discontinuity in the sense that
oral speech and symbolic language (and the ﬂuid mind undergirding it) are found
only in the surviving human lineage that happens to entail agential and self-reﬂective
persons not quite unlike us. We are, in brief, ‘‘alone in the world’’ in a twofold sense:
from a paleoanthropological view, we are alone by being the last remnant of the
hominids on planet Earth; from a theological perspective we are alone by ‘‘being
invited in to a personal relationship with God.’’65
A trans-generational concept of the imago Dei
What is important for van Huyssteen’s theological project when reinterpreting the
biblical symbol of the imago Dei is an understanding of human beings as embodied
persons endowed with symbolic awareness.66 Van Huyssteen makes a tour de force
through the interpretation history of the concept of the imago. Here he is particu-
larly drawn to the view of John Calvin who stated that it may be particularly
appropriate to say that humanity is created in the image of God in respect of
the human soul but that the image extends also to other aspects of human exist-
ence—‘‘there was no part even of the body in which some rays of glory did not
shine.’’67 Similarly he’s tracking the record of twentieth-century interpretations of
the imago in terms of substantive capacities, functional roles, and relational struc-
tures, pausing (with his typical sense of humor) to note that Karl Barth once
remarked that also laughter and smoking belongs to the proprium of being created
62. Questions of social hierarchy, food-sharing, sexual intercourse, and the possibility of including
non-kin in ‘‘kinshipping’’ are central to the program of ‘‘deep history.’’
63. See, in particular, ‘‘Response to My Critics’’ (note 13).
64. Alone in the World?, 199–203.
65. Alone in the World?, 121.
66. As for the evolution of personhood, see J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ‘‘When Were We Persons? Why
Hominid Evolution Holds the Key to Embodied Personhood,’’ Neue Zeitschrift fu¨r Systematische
Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 52(4) (2010): 329–49. On imago Dei and Christology, see ‘‘What
Makes Us Human? The Interdisciplinary Challenge to Theological Anthropology and
Christology,’’ Toronto Journal of Theology 26(2) (2010): 143–60.
67. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559), 1.15, quoted in Alone in the World?,
111, 131.
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in the image and likeness of God.68 In the end, van Huyssteen sides with Wolfhart
Pannenberg in his eschatological interpretation of the imago (ﬁnally a Lutheran
sneaks in!). The point here is that Pannenberg’s wider eschatological perspective is
able to integrate the substantive, functional, and relational aspects of the imago.
Not that the imago is only a matter of a future realization, but that the imago is a
task waiting to be realized for any human being. The capacity for being humane is
a gift of creation, endowed to the human species, and yet it is a destiny in front
of us.69
According to Christian anthropology, the full humanity and the true image of
God is fully realized in Jesus Christ only (Col 1:15; Heb 2:6–9). Even though van
Huyssteen is critical of too eager dogmatic attempts at showing that the imago is
only understandable from a trinitarian perspective (as if being a Christian was a
matter of having a particular Christian gnosis), he does present a picture of what it
means to be a human person, which can best be interpreted as related to an eco-
nomic understanding of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, integrating creation,
christology, and the future fulﬁllment. The symbolic awareness of humans thus
allows us to be in discourse with God (both as speaking and as listening), and to be
connected to one another in caring relationships, also to our ‘‘sister species.’’ In this
understanding, the ﬁnal basis for speaking of a human likeness to God does not lie
merely in our possession of some intellectual capacities, but in speciﬁc uses of these
abilities.70 Thus understood, speaking of the imago Dei can’t be a descriptive aﬀair
only. It must take the form of directive speech, orienting our ways of thinking and
informing our modes of action.71
Concluding reflections
Allow me at the end to compare the outcomes of van Huyssteen’s theological
itinerary with another Giﬀord lecturer, Bruno Latour, who gave the Lectures in
Edinburgh in 2013. In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour argued that we never
really managed to believe in the modern idea of a dichotomy of the natural versus
the cultural, nor in the early modern idea of a full separation of God and world.72
In the vein of van Huyssteen, we could add that if God IS, God cannot be fenced
into the domain of the supernatural as opposed to the natural but must be the
encompassing reality, the source and matrix of all our natural endowments and
68. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1960), 82–83: ‘‘What a pity that
none of these apologists considers it worthy of mention that man is apparently the only being
accustomed to laugh and smoke!,’’ quoted in Alone in the World?, 136.
69. Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, 139–44. See also David Fergusson’s penetrating questions on
anthropocentricism(s), ‘‘Are We Alone and Does It Matter?’’ (in this issue of Theology Today).
70. Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, 38, 159–62.
71. Cf. ibid. 161.
72. Bruno Latour,We have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard,
1993; French original 1991).
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cultural strivings. If Wentzel van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist epistemologically
is basically correct, we have never been purely postmodern. Moreover, if his thesis
in Alone in the World? stands (as I believe it will do), we have never been purely
premodern either. Also our ancestors will have had small spaces of a ‘‘modern’’
control of their environments, as they have also had aspects of a ‘‘postmodern’’
awareness of ﬂuidity, a sense of the possible. They are ‘‘us,’’ and we ‘‘them.’’ Alone
in the world we may be as a species, but humans have always being living and
laughing together, as they have also being weeping, mourning, and hoping
together.
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